Jeremiah R. Blocker
HIUS 713: American Entrepreneurship Since 1900
Introduction –
The Great Depression was the most severe and prolonged economic downturn in modern history, lasting from 1929 to 1939. It began in the United States and spread worldwide, characterized by mass unemployment, sharp declines in industrial production and trade, and widespread bank and business failures. The Great Depression had detrimental effect on the global economy damaging the United States and including but limited to the economically developed countries of Europe.
The start of the Great Depression is generally accepted to have started with the Stock Market Crash of 1929 which crushed consumer confidence and business expenditures leading to huge reduction in spending. The unemployment rate skyrocketed, and economic upheaval wrecked the economy in the United States and globally.[1]
What caused the Great Depression in the United States and made it spread around the globe? And what ultimately led to the recover both in the United States and globally?
There are many different and complex theories as to what caused the Great Depression. These theories are debated among economists and historians with varying degrees of acceptance. However, there is some general consensus on what factors contributed to the underlying cause, and most importantly, led to recovery.[2]
One of the most interesting and plausible theory that has been advanced is that reliance on the Gold standard in the United States and Europe was a major contributor to the Great Depression and the eventual moving away from it helped with the recovery.
The international gold standard linked countries in a system of fixed currency exchange rates, which transmitted the US economic downturn to the rest of the world. Adherence to the standard often forced countries to adopt contractionary monetary policies (raising interest rates), which further depressed spending and investment.
Methodology of Assessment –
A number of economist and historians have evaluated how the Gold Standard played a role in the Great Depression. Some have identified it as the primary cause. In measuring the effects of the Gold standard on cause and recovery from the Great Depression, economist have looked at countries that quickly moved away from the Gold standard such as the United Kingdom as compared to countries like the United States that delayed leaving or waited several years into the Great Depression as France did. The estimation of economist and historians there was a cause and effect in recovery for how quickly a developed country’s economy recovered based on the timing of leaving the Gold standard.[3]
Reasons why the Gold Standard was Cause –
The theory that identifies the Gold standard in the United States as being the primary or, at least, a significant contributor is based on several key factors.
Under the gold standard, a nation’s money supply is tied to its gold reserves. When the United States’ money supply contracted after the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent bank failures, the gold standard forced a global monetary contraction. This led to a period of severe deflation, which discouraged spending and worsened the economic downturn.[4]
When a financial crisis occurred, particularly in the U.S., the gold standard dictated a global monetary contraction to match the one in the U.S., causing widespread deflation (falling prices) and reducing the value of bank collateral. This is known in economics as a “forced deflation” is and can be caused by policy inflexibility such as reliance on the Gold standard to the detriment of the economy.[5]
The Federal Reserve was unable to expand the money supply sufficiently to stop bank failures, and its actions or inactions were seen as contributing to the collapse of the money stock. A limited stimulus handicaps economic recovery.[6]
Because exchange rates were fixed to gold, central banks in countries losing gold reserves to the U.S. were required to raise interest rates and contract their money supplies to protect their currency. This led to a worldwide decline in output and prices, as other nations deflated along with the U.S.
Moving Away from the Gold Standard as a Solution –
Countries that abandoned the gold standard sooner were often able to recover more quickly because they were not constrained by its deflationary pressures.
The gold standard tied the hands of central banks, forcing them to prioritize maintaining a fixed exchange rate over supporting their domestic economies. Exiting the gold standard and devaluing their currency gave countries the flexibility to increase their money supply and stimulate their economies, a critical step toward recovery. Research has shown that countries that left the gold standard earlier, like Britain, began their economic recovery sooner.[7]
Great Britain moved away from the Gold standard in 1931 which led to a noticeable recovery period. The United States waited to move away from the Gold standard until 1933 which did delay recovery. Other countries such as France, waited even longer which led to a delayed recovery.[8]
In the United States, by abandoning the Gold standard, the nation and Federal Reserve were able to increase the money supply. By increasing the money supply and freed of the limitation of the Gold standard, expansion increased spending and lending by businesses and individual investors.
Also, devaluation of the U.S. dollar relative to other currencies made American goods cheaper abroad and foreign goods more expensive in the U.S. leading to boost in the economy. This encouraged exports and discouraged imports, strengthening the U.S. economic outlook.
Conclusions –
There were many factors that contributed to the Great Depression with the Gold standard being one of the many factors. The constraints of being on the Gold standard help amplify the causes and effects of the economic crises. This was true in Europe and globally. The eventual moving away from the Gold standard, thought not fully understood, led to a economic improvement and recovery.
Bibliography
Bemanke, Ben & Harold James. “The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison.” In Financial Markets and Financial Crises (National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report), edited by R. Glenn Hubbard, 33–68. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Duignan, Brian. “Causes of the Great Depression.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/story/causes-of-the-great-depression.
Konkel, Lindsey. “How Did the Gold Standard Contribute to the Great Depression?” HISTORY, May 8, 2018. https://www.history.com/articles/how-did-the-gold-standard-contribute-to-the-great-depression.
Paker, Meredith and Jason Lennard. “The End of the Gold Standard and the Beginning of the Recovery from the Great Depression.” CEPR, 2024. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/end-gold-standard-and-beginning-recovery-great-depression.
Williams, David. “London and the 1931 Financial Crisis.” The Economic History Review 15, no. 3 (1963): 513. https://doi.org/10.2307/2592922.
[1] Brian Duignan, “Causes of the Great Depression.” Encyclopedia Britannica, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/story/causes-of-the-great-depression.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Meredith Parker and Jason Lennard, “The End of the Gold Standard and the Beginning of the Recovery from the Great Depression.” CEPR, 2024. https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/end-gold-standard-and-beginning-recovery-great-depression.
[4] Lindsey Konkel, “How Did the Gold Standard Contribute to the Great Depression?” HISTORY, May 8, 2018. https://www.history.com/articles/how-did-the-gold-standard-contribute-to-the-great-depression.
[5] Robert Samuelson, “Revisiting the Great Depression.” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 36, no. 1 (2012): 36–43.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ben Bemanke and Harold James, “The Gold Standard, Deflation, and Financial Crisis in the Great Depression: An International Comparison.” In Financial Markets and Financial Crises (National Bureau of Economic Research Project Report), edited by R. Glenn Hubbard, 33–68. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
[8] David Williams, “London and the 1931 Financial Crisis.” The Economic History Review 15, no. 3 (1963): 513. https://doi.org/10.2307/2592922.